








    
 
 
   
  
  
Is Freedom of Expression a Universal 
Right? 
LARRY ALEXANDER* 
The title of my Essay asks a question.  If one were to go by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights2—or by John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice3 
and other quotidian works of liberal political and moral philosophy—the 
answer to the question is a resounding “yes.”  Indeed, in the constellation of
cherished liberal rights, freedom of expression is surely one of the
brightest, if not the brightest, of its stars. 
Despite that impressive testimony to its status as a universal right, I 
have concluded that freedom of expression is not a universal right. 
I reached this conclusion almost a decade ago after two decades of 
searching in vain for arguments that would support the opposite
conclusion.4  I had always regarded myself as a strong supporter of freedom
* © 2013 Larry Alexander.  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University 
of San Diego School of Law. Thanks to all the participants in the Freedom of Expression
Roundtable at the University of Melbourne for their comments and to Adrienne Stone for
organizing the roundtable. 
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  Article 19 states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers.” 
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, adopted Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1967; ratified by the United States 
June 8, 1992).
3. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 221–28 (1971). 
4. See generally LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 




















    
 
   
of expression, so it pained me greatly to conclude that freedom of
expression did not have the secure backing of being a universal human 
right.
Before getting to what I see as the practical implications of my negative
conclusion, I will give a brief description of how I, reluctantly, reached 
it. In the early 1980s, Paul Horton and I were asked to write an essay
reviewing Frederick Schauer’s excellent book Free Speech: A Philosophical 
Enquiry.5 We concluded, after surveying the various rationales for free 
speech that Schauer canvassed, that according to none of those rationales
was free speech in any way distinctive.6  To the extent each rationale 
supported free speech, it supported freedom to engage in other activities 
besides free speech. And each rationale supported somewhat distinct,
although overlapping, types of speech.
Despite our negative conclusion in that review essay about finding a 
distinctive free speech principle, I continued thereafter to search for one. 
Nevertheless, about a decade later, I concluded that a sizeable component of
free speech jurisprudence—the so-called time, place, and manner and
other incidental regulations of speech—was completely unprincipled and 
could never be rendered principled.7  I defined this component as including 
all governmental acts that are not aimed at preventing the communication of
a message because of the content of that message but that have an effect
on the communication of messages.  In other words, it theoretically includes 
all laws, and failures to enact laws, other than content regulations that have
message effects—effects on what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with 
what effects.
And which laws fall into this class?  I argued that all laws do. Laws 
that are directed specifically at speech activities—such as laws requiring 
permits to stage demonstrations to allay traffic and safety concerns, laws
preventing pamphleting because of litter concerns, laws prohibiting 
sound trucks because of noise concerns, and laws prohibiting posting 
signs because of aesthetic concerns—clearly fall into this class.  But so, 
too, do laws that are not specifically aimed at speech activities.  The 
trespass laws prevent A from putting his graffiti on the side of B’s house 
without B’s consent, even if the side of B’s house is an excellent location 
for A to get his message to his intended audience.  The law of theft
government suppression of expression” but that “such justifications . . . will vary from 
place to place and from time to time”).
5. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). 
6. Lawrence Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech 
Principle, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1319, 1322, 1357 (1983) (book review). 
7. Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech 
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prevents C from commandeering D’s printing press to get his message
out, even if C does not have the resources to buy his own printing press.
These examples can be multiplied almost without limit. 
Indeed, once we proceed down this road, we can see that laws that seem 
quite removed from speech concerns—the laws of property, tort, contract,
and crime, administrative regulations, and the tax laws—have enormous
message effects.  For they together affect the distribution of resources, 
which in turn affects who says what, to whom, and with what effect. Put
differently, the entire corpus juris, and every alternative corpus juris, will
have profound speech effects. 
And here is what is problematic for any theory of freedom of expression
about the fact that all laws, and all alternative laws, will have profound 
message effects: if one wishes to claim that a particular law violates a
right of freedom of expression, it will not be sufficient merely to show
that the law negatively affects one’s ability to communicate effectively
one’s message to one’s intended audience.  For if that law is excised, its 
excision will have negative message effects on others even if its excision
has positive message effects on you.  And even if adjudicators could,
contrary to fact, trace the causal implications for messages of having one
set of laws rather than an indefinite number of other possible sets of
laws, they would then have to evaluate all those competing message effects.
And how would they do this while remaining properly neutral with respect
to the content of messages?
Any conception of freedom of expression at its core requires that
government be neutral with respect to its evaluation of the content of 
messages.  A government that says, “We respect the freedom to express any
idea we regard as true or valuable but not the freedom to express ideas 
that we regard as false or harmful” would be rightly regarded as hostile 
rather than friendly to freedom of expression.  Stalin, Hitler, and Mao
could have subscribed to that version of freedom of expression. 
Freedom of expression calls for evaluative neutrality on the part of the
government with respect to messages.  However, no court—which, after
all, is an arm of the government—can appraise the message effects of 
laws and the alternatives to those laws without violating evaluative 
neutrality. For the court is never confronted with a law that has negative 
message effects on someone but that does not have positive message effects 
on others—or, to put it differently, the invalidation of which would not






   
 






















message effects on both sides of the equation and no evaluatively neutral 
way to adjudicate between them. 
I published this negative conclusion about the relation between freedom 
of expression and incidental regulations of speech—what Laurence Tribe
called “track two” regulations8—in 1993.9  But that left open Tribe’s
track one regulations, regulations aimed at the content of messages.10 
Was there a tenable theory supporting a right not to have one’s
communications penalized because of the content of the message
communicated?  If there were a universal right of freedom of expression,
it would have to be found in the domain of content regulations.
I find it useful to think about content regulations by asking what harm 
the government is trying to prevent when it penalizes communications 
because of the content of the messages conveyed and what is the causal
process by which the content of the messages is supposed to produce 
that harm.11  Typically, content regulations fall into two harm-causing 
categories.  The largest category is those regulations where the harm the
government is attempting to prevent can be prevented only by keeping
the audience from receiving the message.12  Once the audience receives
the message, either the harm has occurred—because the harm just is the
receipt of the message by the audience—or else the harm will likely
occur through mechanisms that the government cannot control.  I call 
these message-related harms “one-step harms” because they are effectively 
produced in one step: the speaker or writer communicates the message to
the audience, and harm occurs immediately on receipt of the message or 
through further acts of the audience that the government cannot legitimately 
or effectively forbid. Therefore, the only way for the government to prevent
the harms from occurring is by preventing the communication.
What are examples of content regulations aimed at preventing one-
step harms?  Here are some: laws protecting military secrets from reaching 
foreign enemies; laws protecting confidential information or private 
information; laws protecting persons against libel and slander—the
audience that hears defamatory statements and believes them will take 
actions that harm the one libeled but that government cannot forbid;
laws protecting property interests in speech—copyright and trademark
laws; laws aimed at protecting the interest in fair trials; laws protecting
trade secrets; laws enforcing contracts regarding messages; laws protecting 
8. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792 (2d ed. 
1988).
9. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 923, 960–62. 
10. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-2, at 791. 
11. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 55–56. 
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against offense or emotional trauma; laws penalizing harmful deceptive 
statements; and laws against making illegal threats. 
The other category of content regulations consists of those laws 
penalizing messages that cause harms in two steps.13  The first step is the
communication of the message to the audience.  The second is the audience
responding to that message by committing harmful acts.  What is significant 
about these two-step harm regulations is that the government can penalize
the audience’s actions at the second step. If the audience is not legally
responsible—it consists of children or the insane—then, as with defamation,
the government can penalize only the first step, the communication.
Nonetheless, because penalizing the second step will not always deter 
the audience, the government will be tempted to interdict the first step, 
the communication of the inciting message. 
Here are examples of content regulations in the two-step harm category: 
laws against solicitation, incitement, and advocacy of crimes; laws against 
uttering “fighting words”; prohibitions on speaking where the audience 
is turning hostile toward the speaker or toward others; publication of 
dangerous information, such as “how to be a hit man,” “how to build an
atomic bomb,” and “how to crack a safe,” et cetera; and dramatizations or
broadcasts that induce copycat crimes or reckless behaviors. 
With these categories of content regulations in mind, what should one 
conclude about whether there is a tenable principle that demands 
that government refrain from content regulation because content regulation 
violates a human right? 
Take the one-step harm category of content regulations.  To say that
those content regulations violate a human right of freedom of expression 
is tantamount to saying that intellectual property is illegitimate; that one 
has no right against defamations or legitimate expectation that private 
information about oneself will not be publicized; that one has no right
not to be deceived about what one buys or about hazards one may 
encounter; that the clients of doctors, lawyers, and priests have no right
that their communications to these auditors will not be revealed; and so
on. However, if government can legitimately protect people from these 
one-step harms, then it can legitimately engage in the content regulation 
that is the necessary means for that protection. 
Nor will “balancing” these harms against the freedom of expression 
interests of the speakers and their audiences salvage a right of freedom

























     
 
  
of expression. For there is no way consistent with evaluative neutrality
for any governmental body, be it a legislature or a court, to balance these 
competing interests.  How important is it that a lawyer be able to reveal 
to the public a confidential communication by a client that he had
committed a felony when that client is now a candidate for public office? 
Does it depend upon how much this will hurt his candidacy?  How 
relevant you believe this is to his fitness for office?  How much you agree or
disagree with his politics? How much this will affect other clients’ faith 
in the confidentiality of their discussions with lawyers, and how important
you believe that is? 
Things might appear rosier for a right of freedom of expression when
we move to content regulations aimed at two-step harms.  After all, in 
these cases, the government can attempt to prevent the harm by threatening 
the audience with sanctions and leaving the first step, the communication of
the provoking message, unregulated.  Even if this option is less effective
than penalizing both steps, it is available and leaves the expression of the
message alone. 
Indeed, perhaps the most successful theories for a right of freedom of 
expression focused almost entirely on these two-step harm examples.14 
The basic premise was that the audience had a right to hear information 
and arguments and then decide whether to engage in the harmful acts,
and the speakers had, as a corollary, a right to present the audience with 
the information and arguments.  Government could not presume that a 
responsible audience would misuse the information or be persuaded by
arguments to commit harmful acts.  Such a presumption would violate 
the right of the audience to autonomy.
However, even this narrow right of freedom of expression, which 
extended only to a small class of content regulations, did not withstand 
analysis.  First, many communications that might provoke or incite illegal
acts by a legally responsible audience were not confined to a legally 
responsible audience. The audience might contain persons who were 
insane, who were below the age of responsibility, or who were outside the
government’s jurisdiction and thus immune to threats of punishment. 
Second, even where the communication is directed solely at legally 
responsible adults, immunizing it from governmental regulation would 
have quite sweeping consequences.  The ordinary crime of solicitation is
a content regulation based on a two-step harm, and it is no defense for
the solicitors that the solicitees—the contract killers—can be held legally 
responsible if they commit the crimes solicited.  And there is no principled
14. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
204, 209–13 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 
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line between ordinary criminal solicitations and “mere advocacy” of illegal
behavior. Moreover, mere likelihood that the message will or will not 
result in an illegal act is (1) irrelevant in the case of ordinary criminal
solicitation and (2) unrelated to the principle of audience autonomy.  It 
suggests a right to advocate crime only when the advocacy will be
ineffective—a decidedly odd right. 
Third, if one held a maximalist conception of the right of the responsible 
audience to assess the truth and value of all messages and not have the 
government prevent it from doing so, the one-step harm regulations of 
defamations and deceptions would be impermissible.15  For the audience
would have the “right” to hear the speaker’s defamation of Jones or his
claim that the Bridge of San Luis Rey is safe to walk on, and punishing 
the speaker to prevent his communicating those messages to the audience 
would be violative of this right.  Nor could this right be cabined by
exempting false statements of “fact” from its scope and protecting only
false statements of “opinion” or “value.”16  For statements of opinion
or value have persuasive force only if they imply brute facts or “facts” about 
what are proper inferences to draw.  So if the claims of opinion or value 
are false, they rest on false facts or improper inferences.  A maximalist
rendering of audience autonomy therefore undermines laws protecting
persons from defamations and deceptions. 
Finally, government has limited resources; this means that although it
may theoretically prevent crimes by threatening the audience, as a practical
matter, its limited resources will often be more efficiently employed 
by directing them at the communication of the provoking messages.  Hostile 
audience cases are good examples.  The police may not have enough
personnel and material resources to stop a riled audience from going on a
deadly rampage.  Stopping the speaker from riling the audience may be
the only feasible option.  Indeed, sometimes, as, for example, with a sleeper
cell of terrorists awaiting a coded message signaling “attack,” the 
government will not know who the audience is and will know only who 
is trying to send that audience a message. 
I concluded that there was no principle supporting a human right of 
freedom of expression, even if restricted to content regulation, and even 
if further restricted to content regulation predicated on a two-step harm.17 
15. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 68–71. 
16. Id. at 70–71. 






    
   
  




    









    
 
 
Moreover, and even more significantly, I concluded that there was a
reason why there could not be such a principle, a reason that went beyond 
freedom of expression and placed in doubt the principled backing of other
iconic liberal rights, such as those of freedom of religion and freedom
of association.18 Any political morality must avoid self-effacement. 
That means that no political morality can place a positive value on acts
that contravene it or that threaten to contravene it.  Liberalism can place a
positive value only on acts that are consistent with liberalism. And liberals 
thus cannot place a positive value on antiliberal speech, religion, or
association. These liberal freedoms—speech, religion, association—require 
evaluative neutrality.  Just as it is a parody of freedom of expression 
to have freedom to express orthodoxy but not heterodoxy, so too is freedom
of religion a parody when the freedom is restricted to orthodoxy. But
liberalism cannot be evaluatively neutral about itself or about the rights 
it protects. It cannot be neutral about antiliberal speech, religion, or
association; it must view these negatively.  Thus, there is a paradox at the 
heart of liberalism: liberalism requires, but cannot embrace, evaluative 
neutrality. 
This was a painful conclusion for me, for I desperately wanted to discover 
a principled basis for a coherent and robust notion of freedom of expression,
and freedom of religion and association as well.  Nonetheless, I found 
that I was stymied by this liberal paradox at every turn.
If there is no human right of freedom of expression, where does that 
leave matters with respect to freedom of expression?  I concluded in my
book on the subject—and I stand by that conclusion—that there are good 
arguments for legally protecting freedom of expression in circumscribed 
domains.19  Those arguments will have an indirect consequentialist 
structure.  They will aver that a legal requirement that government adhere to
content neutrality within certain regulatory domains will likely produce 
better consequences, however determined, than if government is allowed 
to restrict expression in that domain based on the messages conveyed. 
Like all indirect consequentialist arguments, those for specific domains of
content neutrality will be highly speculative.  Moreover, they will be time 
and place specific. As I argued, 
[T]he amount and types of freedom of expression that produce good consequences 
will vary with the form of government, the degree of political stability, the level 
of wealth, the state of technology, the general level of education, the culture, 
18. Id. at 147–81. 
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the structure of the news media and other media of expression and communication, 
and numerous other factors.20 
The expression that Australia should permit in 2012 will probably differ,
perhaps considerably, from the expression Malawi should permit, and 
both will probably differ from the expression Greece should permit. 
Freedom of expression—a content-neutral, hands-off governmental 
approach to expression—has much to commend it even if it is not a
universal human right. Democratic government requires that citizens be 
decently informed about government’s actions, and governments are not
particularly trustworthy when it comes to refraining from suppressing valid 
criticisms of it.  Some degree of freedom of expression undoubtedly
contributes to knowledge that is useful to consumers and producers in
the marketplace, to scientific and technological progress, to artistic
accomplishments, and to our functioning as responsible moral agents. 
On the other hand, freedom of expression can produce various “bads” 
as well as these “goods.” Its messages can defame, intrude on privacy, 
disclose secrets and confidences, violate property rights in content, deceive, 
threaten, incite, offend, and so on.  And its nonmessage aspects can create 
traffic snarls, litter, noise, trespasses, intrusions into personal space, and 
many, many more harms. 
Taking these various goods and bads of freedom of expression into 
account, are there any defensible conclusions one can reach about whether a
right to freedom of expression should be legally protected, and if protected, 
what its scope and limits should be?  Here are some highly tentative 
answers. 
First, with respect to incidental—nonmessage-related—restrictions of 
expression, I believe it would be desirable social policy for economically
advanced countries to ensure the existence of a wide variety of cheaply
accessible media and perhaps some media open to all speakers, such as
the Internet. There are problems of getting the correct balance between
having too many speakers, which causes either cacophony or cascading, 
and having too few, which results in the exclusion of worthwhile messages. 
And the right balance might also depend on whether the messages are
political, scientific, artistic, cultural, or commercial. Moreover, courts are 
not well equipped to do this balancing.  Legislatures are better equipped, 
although they may be less trustworthy than courts. 





   





















With respect to protecting messages that cause one-step harms,
one must ask whether those harms are violations of deontological
side constraints or whether those harms are merely harms from a
consequentialist standpoint.  If it is the former, then any legally
constructed right of freedom of expression that protects messages that
cause those harms is unjustified.  For given the absence of a moral right 
of freedom of expression, we have a right on only one side of the balance,
the side of the one harmed by the message.  As an example, some believe 
that intellectual property rights are natural—prelegal—moral rights.21  If 
that is correct, then expression that violates intellectual property rights in 
the message expressed violates prelegal property rights but is not itself
the exercise of a prelegal right. 
When the one-step harms are not themselves violations of deontological
rights, then we are left with purely consequentialist balancing.  Note that 
this cannot be case-by-case balancing focused on each token of expression. 
Rather, for a domain of freedom of expression to exist, we must have a
domain of evaluative equality among messages within that domain, which
means that the consequentialist balancing will be wholesale not retail, rule-
consequentialist rather than act-consequentialist.  For retail, case-by-case,
token-not-type, act-consequentialist balancing does not treat expression 
of messages as distinct from other acts.
So, for example, the requirement of lawyer-client confidentiality most
plausibly has an indirect consequentialist justification.  To ask whether 
freedom of expression should legally trump lawyer-client confidentiality
is not to ask whether some particular token of violation of that 
confidentiality can be justified by its consequences. Rather, it is to ask
whether the practice of protecting those confidences as a whole produces 
better consequences than its absence, which would allow lawyers to reveal 
those confidences in their communications to others. 
The problem in constructing this kind of indirect consequentialist 
balance is that we cannot know in advance what kind of information will 
be lost to the public if lawyer-client confidentiality is maintained and 
what kind of information will be gained if it is not.  And if we did know, 
our assessment—and thus the assessments of legislatures and courts— 
would be partisan rather than evaluatively neutral.  But even if we omit
21. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 
(1993) (“When the limitations in natural law’s premises are taken seriously, natural 
rights not only cease to be a weapon against free expression; they also become a source 
of affirmative protection for free speech interests.”); see also Jon M. Garon, Normative 
Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1278, 1295–97 (2003) (attributing Locke as the source for the view that copyright 
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the latter concern, the former concern remains.  What information is lost
or gained by tinkering with the protections of reputation, privacy, secrecy,
confidentiality, intellectual property, sensibility, and so on is completely
unknowable. 
Two-step message harms are a somewhat different matter.  Let me
quote from the final chapter of my book on the subject:
In Chapter Four we sought in vain for a principled justification that would
neither insulate all expression of this type from legal suppression nor insulate 
none of it. The line-drawing the courts in various countries have engaged in to
distinguish advocacy from incitement, solicitation, and “fighting words,” or
ordinary accounts of criminal activity from how-to-books on crime, or false 
statements of “fact” from false expressions of “opinion” or “value,” were, I
argued, ultimately without principled foundations. 
Nevertheless, even in the absence of principled lines of demarcation, much 
less the foundation provided by a human right, there are good reasons to carve
out some domain where government is prohibited from suppressing messages 
because the content of those messages is false, deceptive, or otherwise likely to 
cause audiences to engage in harmful conduct. Surely, and particularly in
democracies, messages that are critical of the government and its policies should be
protected to some extent, even if the government regards them as dangerously false
or misleading.  Even with a defense of truth permitted, prosecutions for seditious 
libel run the risk of deterring accurate criticisms of the government along with 
false or misleading ones.  And even though we cannot in advance of receiving 
those messages assess whether the number and value of deterred accurate
messages—remember, we are dropping the evaluative neutrality constraint— 
outweigh or are outweighed by the number and disvalue of the suppressed 
ones, there are dangers in giving the government power to suppress criticism 
on grounds that it is false or misleading and dangerous.  Government may not 
act in good faith, but may try to cover up its misdeeds and embarrassments;
and even adjudicative processes may not reveal all such cover-ups.  And even 
if government does act in good faith and goes after only those messages that it 
sincerely believes are false or misleading or dangerous, it will quite naturally 
tend to overestimate the dangers of such messages, to devalue the benefits for
public awareness and debate of even misguided criticisms, and to misassess the
accuracy of those criticisms.
Moreover, even if government is correct about the falsity and danger of the 
messages, it may underestimate the negative indirect consequences of suppression.
Suppression may impede valuable enterprises out of which the erroneous criticisms 
of government emerged: for example, the quests for social and natural scientific
truth, or for moral and religious truth. Suppression may infantilize the population 
and stunt its moral and intellectual virtues (an essentially Millian point). Perhaps
even more importantly, suppression is frequently ineffectual or worse. It may
draw attention to and make martyrs of the dissenters, glamorizing and spreading
rather than suppressing their ideas.  It may drive criticism and dissent underground,
which breeds resentment, alienation, and conspiracy.  It is frequently better to
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allow dissent and know who the dissenters are than to suppress it and have 
dissent circulate in secrecy. 
These are a few of the consequentialist arguments that can be marshaled against
suppression of speech that might mislead audiences about the probity, justness,
or wisdom of the government and its policies and induce the audience to
commit harmful acts, ranging from subversion and criminality to replacing
good governors with bad ones.  Many of those arguments apply in some measure to
suppression of false or deceptive messages beyond those critical of the government, 
and even beyond politics.  Thus, there are reasons not to suppress false and
misleading scientific claims, religious claims, cultural claims, moral claims, and
even medical claims and commercial claims.  In the United States, the First 
Amendment has been invoked to protect false and misleading scientific, religious, 
cultural, and moral claims but not to protect false and misleading medical or
commercial claims.  The somewhat perverse result is that because they are subject
to penalty if false or misleading, we do—and can, justifiably—rely on the latter
claims; on the other hand, because they are immune from government sanctions, 
the former claims are regarded as likely to be dishonest or baseless and thus
unreliable. 
One commentator has characterized the consequentialist considerations for
freeing up some speech that might be suppressed because of two-step harms in
the following way:
First, being able to speak our minds makes us feel good.  True, we 
tailor our words to civility, persuasion, kindness, or other purposes, but 
that is our choice.  Censors claim the right to purge other people’s talk—all 
the while insisting that it is for our own good. 
Second, much censorship appears irrational and alarmist in retrospect
because the reasons people choose and use words are vastly more 
interesting than the systems designed to limit them.  It’s not hard to
make a list of absurdities—I’m particularly fond of a rash of state laws 
that forbid the disparagement of agricultural products—but simplistic 
explanations and simple-minded responses are as dangerous as they are 
ditzy.  In one of the few places that postmodern theory and common
sense intersect, it is obvious that the meaning and perception of words
regularly depend on such variables as speaker and spoken to, individual 
experience and shared history, and the setting, company, and spirit in
which something is said.  To give courts or other authorities the power to
determine all this is, to put it mildly, mind-boggling. 
Third, censorship is inimical to democracy.  Cloaking ideas and
information in secrecy encourages ignorance, corruption, demagoguery, 
a corrosive distrust of authority, and a historical memory resembling
Swiss cheese.  Open discussion, on the other hand, allows verities to be
examined, errors to be corrected, disagreement to be expressed, and 
anxieties to be put in perspective.  It also forces communities to confront
their problems directly, which is more likely to lead to real solutions 
than covering them up. 
    Fourth, censorship backfires. Opinions, tastes, social values, and mores
change over time and vary among people.  Truth can be a protean thing.
The earth’s rotation, its shape, the origins of humankind, and the nature 
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from what we know today, yet those who challenged the prevailing faith
were mocked and punished for their apostasy. Banning ideas in an 
attempt to make the world safe from doubt, disaffection, or disorder is
limiting, especially for people whose lives are routinely limited, since the
poor and politically weak are the censor’s first targets. 
Finally, censorship doesn’t work.  It doesn’t get rid of bad ideas or bad
behavior.  It usually doesn’t even get rid of bad words, and history has
shown repeatedly that banning the unpalatable merely drives it 
underground. It could be argued that that’s just fine, that vitriolic or
subversive speech, for example, shouldn’t dare to speak its name.  But
hateful ideas by another name—disguised as disinterested intellectual
inquiry, or given a nose job like Ku Klux Klansman David Duke before 
he ran for governor of Louisiana—are probably more insidious than
those that are clearly marginal.22 
Let me close with a couple of examples.  So-called hate speech—speech 
that disparages ethnic, racial, or religious groups—is generally prohibited in
most Western countries but not in the United States, where it is 
constitutionally protected as a matter of freedom of speech. If we leave 
aside the one-step harm of offense and focus on the two-step harms of
inciting others to violence or to discrimination against members of the 
disparaged groups, we can understand why some countries, given their 
history and culture, would be quite fearful of the effects hate speech might 
have. For example, think of Germany and anti-Semitic speech.  On the 
other hand, in the twenty-first-century United States, the dangers of hate 
speech pale in comparison to the dangers of suppressing it.  Suppression 
drives haters underground, where they may be more dangerous than if 
they were more visible.  Suppression is frequently not evenhanded:
disparagement of some favored groups is punished, but disparagement of 
other groups is not.  Frequently, suppression of hate speech is an expression 
of power wielded by some groups over other groups rather than an
expression of concern about violence or discrimination. Sometimes,
suppression of hate speech is just partisan politics.  In the United States,
some groups have tried to label messages such as opposition to racial 
preferences as racist hate speech.  And political correctness surely infects
enforcement of hate speech laws.  Consider the prosecution of Mark Steyn 
in British Columbia because of his book expressing political concerns over 
22. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 191–93 (footnotes omitted) (quoting in part NAN 




   
 
 
     
 
 
       
  
  




     
  
the ever-increasing percentage of Muslims in Europe.23  So whether hate 
speech laws are a good or bad thing will undoubtedly vary with the 
country, its history, its culture, and its politics. 
The same point can be made with respect to restrictions on culture-
coarsening expression—pornography, violent video games, public profanity,
and so forth. Culture coarsening is a real harm, and its baleful effects may 
even prove catastrophic.  On the other hand, whether legal restrictions on
expression that contributes to coarsening is a good idea will vary with the 
place, the time, the institutions, the current state of the culture, and so
forth. Governments are generally pretty ham-fisted when it comes 
to defining culture-coarsening messages.  The history in the United States
of attempts to ban pornography is not reassuring.  Other countries with 
other institutions may do a better job. 
I close with how I closed my book on freedom of expression: 
There are many good reasons for governments not to regulate expression for
the purpose of affecting messages, but that freedom of expression is a human
right is not one of them. There is no human right of freedom of expression. 
Nor is there an indirect-consequentialist justification for a domain of freedom 
of expression . . . that is constant across time and place. Rather, there are 
indirect-consequentialist arguments that might justify the special treatment of 
expression, but that treatment will vary from place to place and from time to
time.  Justified rights regarding expression will always be limited, local, and 
based on hunches about consequences.  That is not as grand and inspiring a basis
for freedom of expression as deeming it to be a human right.  It does, however, 
have the virtue of realism.24 
23. See Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, “Legal Jihad”: How Islamist Lawfare 
Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 395, 404 (2009). 
24. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 193 (footnotes omitted). 
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